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Abstract—Emerging non-volatile main memory (NVMM) is
rapidly being integrated into computer systems. However,
NVMM is vulnerable to potential data remanence and replay
attacks.
Established security models including split counter mode
encryption and Bonsai Merkle tree (BMT) authentication have
been introduced against such data integrity attacks. However,
these security methods are not readily compatible with NVMM.
Recent works on secure NVMM pointed out the need for data and
its metadata, including the counter, the message authentication
code (MAC), and the BMT to be persisted atomically. However,
memory persistency models have been overlooked for secure
NVMM, which is essential for crash recoverability.
In this work, we analyze the invariants that need to be ensured
in order to support crash recovery for secure NVMM. We
highlight that prior research has substantially under-estimated
the cost of BMT persistence and propose several optimization
techniques to reduce the overhead of atomically persisting
updates to BMTs. The optimizations proposed explore the use
of pipelining, out-of-order writes, and update coalescing while
conforming to strict or epoch persistency models respectively.
We evaluate our work and show that our proposed optimizations
significantly reduce the performance overhead of secure NVMM
with crash recoverability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-volatile main memory (NVMM) is coming online, of-
fering non-volatility, good scaling potential, high density, low
idle power, and byte addressability. A recent NVMM example
is Intel Optane DC Persistent Memory, providing a capacity of
3TB per socket [22]. Due to non-volatility, data may remain
in main memory for a very long time even without power,
exposing data to potential attackers [8]. Consequently, NVMM
requires memory encryption and integrity protection to match
the security of DRAM (which we refer to as secure NVMM),
or to provide secure enclave environment. Furthermore, it is
expected that NVMM may store persistent data that must
provide crash recoverability, a property where a system can
always recover to a consistent memory state after a crash.
Crash recoverability property offers multiple benefits, such as
allowing persistent data to be kept in memory data structures
instead of in files, and as a fault tolerance technique to reduce
checkpointing frequency [1], [14], [23], [24], [46]. Finally,
some applications have emerged that need to run on secure
enclave and yet require persistency and crash recovery, such
as a shadow file system [19].
Crash recovery of data with NVMM is achieved through
defining and using memory persistency models. However,
traditional memory persistency models do not automatically
extend to secure NVMM, which incur two new requirements:
1 the correct plaintext value of data must be recovered,
and 2 data recovery must not trigger integrity verification
failure. To meet these requirements, the central question is
what items must persist together, and what persist ordering
constraints are there to guarantee the above crash recovery
requirements? Prior studies have not answered this question
fully. Liu et al. pointed out that counters, data, and message
authentication codes (MACs) must persist atomically [33],
but ignored the Merkle Tree that provides integrity protection
required to avoid effortless cryptanalysis. Awad et al. pointed
out that Merkle Tree must also be persisted leaf-to-root [4],
but did not answer what ordering requirements are needed for
correct crash recovery, and how they are related to persistency
models.
The focus of this work is to comprehensively analyze the
persist requirement and persist ordering requirements required
for correct crash recovery of secure NVMM. Getting this
analysis right is important. Not only it affects correctness
(i.e., whether the above crash recovery requirements are
met), but it also affects performance overheads (i.e., accurate
quantification of the actual performance overheads) and the
reasoning of what performance optimizations are possible.
For example, one property missed by prior work is that leaf-
to-root updates of Bonsai Merkle trees (BMT) must follow
persist order, otherwise crash recovery may trigger integrity
verification failure at system recovery. Obeying this ordering
constraint, we found that the overheads of crash recoverable
strict persistency (SP) is about 20× slowdown, which is more
than one order of magnitude higher than previously reported
slowdown.
In this paper, we analyze and derive invariants that are
needed to ensure correct crash recovery (i.e., correct plain-
text value is recovered and no integrity verification failure
is triggerred). Then, to reduce the performance overheads,
we propose performance optimizations, which we refer to
as persist-level parallelism, or PLP, that comply with the
invariants for strict and epoch persistency (EP) models. For
SP, we found that pipelining BMT updates is an effective PLP
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optimization, which brings down the performance overheads
from 7.2× to 2.1×, compared to a secure processor model
with write back caches but not supporting any persistency
model. We then analyze EP where persist ordering within an
epoch is relaxed, but enforced across epochs. Under EP, two
more PLP optimizations were enabled besides pipelining: out-
of-order BMT update and BMT update coalescing. These two
optimizations reduce overheads to 20.2%.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are:
• To our knowledge, this is the first work that fully analyzes
crash recovery correctness for secure NVMM, and formu-
lates crash recovery invariants required under different
persistency models.
• For strict persistency, we propose a new optimization for
pipelining BMT updates.
• For epoch persistency, we propose two new optimiza-
tions: out-of-order BMT updates and BMT update coa-
lescing.
• We point out that, due to incomplete reasoning of crash
recovery, prior studies did not provide correct crash re-
covery and substantially underestimated its performance
overheads.
• An evaluation showing that our proposed PLP optimiza-
tions above significantly reduce the performance over-
head of secure NVMM.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the background and related work. Section III
dives into the motivation for our work, Section IV details
four BMT update systems, including the baseline used for
evaluation and the three models proposed. Section V discussed
our hardware architecture, Section VI evaluates our proposed
update mechanisms, and Section VII concludes this work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Threat Model
We assume an adversary who has physical access to the
memory system (NVMM and system bus), e.g. through own-
ership, theft, acquisition after system disposal, etc. Similar to
the incidence of recovering sensitive data from improperly dis-
posed used hard drives [42], [54], data remanence in NVMM
extends such vulnerabilities to data in memory [8]. In addition,
NVMMs are potentially vulnerable to replay attacks [2] and
cold boot attacks [20], [38], which allow malicious entities
access to the systems. Similar to prior work [3], [4], [30], [31],
[45], we assume that the adversary cannot read the content
of on-chip resources such as registers and caches, hence
the processor chip forms the trust boundary where trusted
computing base (TCB) may be located. All off-chip devices,
including main memory and memory bus, are considered
vulnerable to both passive (snooping) and active (tampering)
attacks. These assumptions are essential to secure processor
architecture [9], [15], [48], [50], [53], [56], [57].
B. Memory Encryption
The goal of memory encryption is to conceal the plaintext of
data written to the off-chip main memory [29], [32], [49], [63].
Counter mode encryption [3], [37], [43], [56] is commonly
used for this purpose. It works by encrypting a counter to
generate a pseudo one time pad (OTP) which is XORed with
the plaintext (or ciphertext) to get ciphertext (or plaintext).
To be secure, pads cannot be reused, and hence the counter
must be incremented after each write back (for temporal
uniqueness) and concatenated with address to form a seed
(for spatial uniqueness). Counters may be monolithic (as in
Intel SGX [12], [18]) or split (as in Yan et al. [43], [56]).
Split counter co-locates a per-page major counter and many
per-block minor counters on a single cache block, and each
cache block is represented by the concatenation of a major
and a minor counter. Due to its much lower memory overhead
(1.56% vs. 12.5% with monolithic counter [56]), counter cache
performance increases and the overall decryption overhead
decreases. Hence, we assume the use of a split counter
organization for the rest of the paper.
C. Memory Integrity Verification
Memory encrypted using counter mode encryption is vul-
nerable to a counter replay attack which allows the attacker
to break the encryption [56], hence memory integrity verifi-
cation is needed not only to protect data integrity, but also
to protect encryption from trivial cryptanalysis [40], [61].
Data fetched from off-chip memory must be decrypted and
its integrity verified when it arrives on chip. Early memory
integrity protection relied on Merkle Tree covering the entire
memory [16], with the root of the tree always kept securely
on chip. When using counter mode encryption, Rogers et
al. proposed Bonsai Merkle Tree (BMT) [43] that employs
stateful MACs to protect data, leaving a much smaller and
shallower tree covering only counters. A stateful MAC uses
data, address, and counter as input to the MAC calculation;
any modification to any MAC input or the MAC itself becomes
detectable. Since it is sufficient to have one input component
with freshness protection, BMT only needs to cover counters.
Intel SGX adopted this observation to design a similar stateful
MAC approach to construct a counter tree that combines
counters and MACs [18]. Saileshwar et. al [45] and Taassori
et. al [52] discussed optimizations that further reduce the BMT
size.
D. Intel SGX
Secure enclaves, e.g. Intel SGX, were designed to provide
secure execution environments for application software. By
combining memory encryption and integrity protection with
attestation and key sealing/management, it provides an appli-
cation protection against compromised system software (OS
and hypervisor). SGX Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) uses
monolithic 56-bit counters instead of the more space efficient
split counter. An integrity ”counter” tree is used for integrity
verification. A counter tree node co-locates counters with a
MAC, the MAC accepts as input the counters it is co-located,
and the parent counter for the block. This results in a highly
interleaved but parallelizable integrity tree that covers the
entire enclave memory [12], [18].
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E. Memory Persistency
Memory persistency is defined to allow the reasoning of
crash recovery for persistent data, an important benefit offered
by non-volatile main memory (NVMM) [6], [7], [11], [13],
[25], [27], [34], [39], [41], [55]. Specifically, it defines the
visible ordering of loads and stores seen by a crash recovery
observer [35], [39]. A persistency model defines when a store
persists (i.e. becomes durable) with respect to other stores
of the same thread, and oftentimes coupled with memory
consistency models to ensure visibility to other threads.
The most conservative model, strict persistency (SP) re-
quires that persists follow the sequential program order of
stores [39]. While providing simple reasoning, SP does not
allow any overlapping or reordering of persists, limiting
optimization opportunities in the system and incurring high
performance overheads. More relaxed persistency models in-
clude epoch persistency (EP) and buffered epoch persistency
(BEP) [39], as well as lazy persistency [1]. With EP (or BEP),
programmers define regions of code that form epochs [17],
[26]. Persists within an epoch can be reordered and overlapped,
but persists across epochs are strictly ordered using persist
barriers, which enforce that persists in an older epoch must
complete prior to the execution (or completion) of any persist
from a younger epoch. On top of a persistency model, crash
recovery often requires the programmer to define atomic
durable code regions [10], [13], [36], [44], [47], [60].
F. Secure NVMM for Crash Recovery
Data remanence vulnerability exists with DRAM as data
may persist for weeks under very low temperature [20], [38].
The vulnerability is much worse with NVM since data is
retained for years, hence self-encrypting memory has been
proposed [8], [59], [63]. However, NVM will likely host
persistent data that requires supporting crash recovery, which
then requires integrating memory encryption and integrity
verification with memory persistency. This has been explored
only recently. Swami et. al [51] proposed co-locating data,
counters, and MAC, to make it easier to atomically persist
them together. Liu et al. [33] proposed a similar approach,
plus an alternative approach of using the memory controller
(MC) as a gathering point for atomic persistence. While
necessary, these studies ignored Merkle Tree integrity veri-
fication required for correct crash recovery. Awad et al. [4]
looked at persisting data, counters, and BMT, but ignored
ordering requirements needed for correct crash recovery, and
persistency models that are relevant for the ordering. Zuo
et. al [64] proposed coalescing counter for persisting counter
cache data, but did not acknowledge additional requirements
for counter integrity verification.
III. CORRECTNESS OF CRASH RECOVERY
In this section, we formulate the invariants that need to be
ensured in order to support crash recovery for secure NVMM.
The system we assume is one with volatile on-chip caches,
with the persistent domain including the NVMM and the write
pending queue (WPQ) inside the MC. Our analysis focuses
on a system with counter-mode memory encryption along
with MAC and BMT memory integrity verification. Counters,
MACs, and BMT nodes are cacheable and can be lost with
the loss of power, except the BMT root which is always stored
persistently on chip. We will discuss Intel SGX MEE later in
the paper.
Suppose that plaintext P at address A is encrypted using
counter γ and private key K to yield ciphertext C, i.e.,
C = EK(P,A, γ) and necessarily the decryption follows
P = DK(C,A, γ). Suppose also that M represents a message
authentication code for C, i.e., M = MACK(C,A, γ). Finally
suppose that BMT covers all counters and has a root R. We
define BMT update path as follows:
Definition 1: BMT update path is the path of nodes from
a leaf node (i.e., one encryption page) to the root of BMT.
X41 X42 X43 X44 X45 X46 X47 X48
X31 X32 X33 X34
X21 X22
X1
δ
Secure processor 
boundary
BMT Root
X1
X2
X3
X4
1 δ2
Fig. 1: An example showing two BMT updates with their
update paths. Persist δ1’s path is shown in grey (X41, X31,
X21, X1) while δ2’s update path is striped (X48, X34, X22,
X1).
Figure 1 shows an example with two persists that generate
updates to the BMT. Update δ1 is represented by nodes
shown in grey while update δ2 is shown with stripes. Note
that all update paths necessarily intersect at the root but the
intersection can also happen earlier.
Definition 2: Common Ancestors of two persists are nodes
in the BMT tree that appear in the BMT update paths of both
persists. The Least Common Ancestor (LCA) is a common
ancestor that is at the lowest-to-leaf level compared to all other
common ancestor nodes.
In the example in Figure 1, the common ancestor consists
of only the BMT root, hence the BMT root is also the LCA.
However, if another persist causes an update at node X46, then
this update and δ2 share X22 and X1 as common ancestors,
with X22 being the LCA.
We also define a memory tuple as a collection of items that
are needed to crash recover a datum:
Definition 3: Secure memory transforms an on-chip plain-
text data P at block address A to a memory tuple of
(C, γ,M,R) when data is persisted to main memory, and vice
versa when persisted data is read from main memory.
The memory tuple represents the totality of transformation
of a block when it is written back (out of the last level cache
or LLC) to off-chip memory, and we claim that each tuple
item must be available in order to recover data correctly, and
3
failure to persist any item(s) in the tuple results in a crash
recovery problem:
Invariant 1: Crash Recovery Tuple Invariant. In a secure
memory with counter-mode encryption and MAC/BMT veri-
fication, in order to recover a datum P that was persisted in
memory, its entire memory tuple (C, γ,M,R) must have been
persisted as well.
To illustrate this, suppose that a plaintext value Po is
changed to a new value Pn. The memory tuple for the block
then must change from (Co, γo,Mo, Ro) to (Cn, γn,Mn, Rn).
If some tuple item was not persisted, for example Mn, post-
crash, (Cn, γn,Mo, Rn) is recovered. In this case, the correct
plaintext is recovered but MAC verification fails because
the old MAC (Mo) fetched from memory mismatches with
MACK(Cn, A, γn). If instead γn was not persisted, since
Pn 6= DK(Cn, A, γo), the correct plaintext is not recovered.
Not only that, since γo is input to MAC and BMT verification,
both verification mechanisms fail as well. Table I lists the
outcomes of not persisting one or more of the memory tuple.
TABLE I: Recovery failure cases due to persist failure
C γ M R Outcome√ √ √ × BMT (verification) failure√ √ × √ MAC (verification) failure√ × √ √ Wrong plaintext, BMT&MAC failure
× √ √ √ Wrong plaintext, MAC failure
Note that the crash tuple invariant (Invariant 1) specifies
the necessary and sufficient condition for recovering data post
crash. It does not specify exactly ”when” tuple items must be
persisted with respect to the data persist; this depends on the
crash recovery expectation of the program and the persistency
model being assumed.
So far we have discussed the crash recovery correctness for
a single data persist. To support crash recovery, programmers
must reason about not just a single persist, but multiple persists
and the relative ordering between them. In this case, we
assume that if there is possibility that the crash recovery
observer reads the persistent memory state between two per-
sists, then the two persists must be ordered. Now suppose
that there are two ordered persistent stores (persists) α1 and
α2 to the different blocks. For the memory tuples of these
different blocks, it is possible that these blocks may modify
the same counter block, the same MAC block, and definitely
the same BMT root. If the persist order of memory tuples is not
followed, recoverability is problematic. For example, suppose
that α1 → α2 but R2 → R1, which means that the BMT root
is updated by the second persist before by the first persist. If
a crash occurs prior to either of them or after both of them,
recoverability is not jeopardized. But at other points, recovery
can fail. For example, suppose that a crash occurs after α1
and R2 persist but before α2 and R1 persist. Post crash, BMT
verification failure occurs due to the root not reflecting the
persist of α1. In other words:
Invariant 2: Persist Order Invariant. Suppose that α1
happens before α2 in program order. If the crash recovery
observer may read out the persistent state between α1 and α2,
then α2 must follow α1 in persist order, i.e. α1 → α2. If
α1 → α2 in persist order, then for correct crash recovery, the
following must hold: (C1, γ1,M1, R1)→ (C2, γ2,M2, R2) in
persist order, i.e. the persist order of each respective memory
tuple items must follow the order of data persists.
Note that the persist order depends on the persistency
models that are assumed. For SP, every persist is ordered with
respect to others. Hence, Invariant 2 applies to each pair of
persists. However, for an EP model, persists are ordered or
Invariant 2 applies only if they are from different epochs.
Persists from the same epoch are unordered, which gives
a rise to optimization opportunities that we will discuss in
Section IV.
The key consequence of Invariant 2 is that persist ordering
imposes a very high cost that scales with the size of BMT.
Upon eviction of a block from LLC, the data, its counter,
and MAC are sent to the MC, but there they must wait until
BMT update from leaf reaches the root, before the persist can
be considered successful. For example, for a full 8-ary BMT
constructed for an 8TB NVMM system would have a tree
height of 12, meaning that for an atomic writeback of security
metadata, the change to leaf nodes must traverse the 12 levels
of the BMT to persist the BMT root, prior to the next persist.
Assuming a hash latency of 80 processor cycles [30], this adds
up to 960 processor cycles for one memory update!
IV. STREAMLINING BMT UPDATES
In this section, we explore how BMT update performance
due to persists can be improved. Performance optimization
techniques that are possible depend on 1 no violation against
invariants discussed in the previous section, and 2 the persis-
tency model that is assumed. We collectively refer to the key
methods as persist-level parallelism (PLP): pipelining, out-of-
order updates, and coalescing.
A. Strict Persistency
1) Baseline Atomic Persist Mechanism: Following Invari-
ant 1, for each memory update, we need to ensure that all
memory tuple components also persist. Due to the write-back
cache, the eviction order of dirty blocks may be different
from the program order. Therefore, with SP, one way to
satisfy the invariant is to atomically persist the tuple gen-
erated by each store, which results in write-through cache
behavior. To achieve this, we devise a 2-step persist (2SP)
mechanism. Similar to [33], 2SP relies on the WPQ of the
MC as persist gathering point. 2SP consists of two steps:
the first step involves holding and locking persist memory
tuple components in the WPQ (while flagged as incomplete),
while the second step flags the completion of the persist and
releases tuple components to memory. A persist is marked
completed when the WPQ receives its updated counter, MAC,
and acknowledgement that the BMT root has been updated.
Once completed, the blocks are allowed to drain from the
WPQ to the NVMM. On power failure, any incomplete flagged
blocks are considered not persisted and invalidated. Since the
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persistence of the counter and MAC is straightforward and
not expensive, we will focus the rest of the discussion on the
expensive BMT update.
To illustrate the mechanism, suppose that two persists are
initiated, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the sequence
of persists of memory tuples due to the two persists, in the
baseline persist mechanism. For persist δ1, ciphertext C1,
counter γ1, MAC M1 are persisted. A new value of counter
γ1 is needed for the BMT update path starting from leaf of
BMT X41, which in turn is needed to update BMT node X31,
and so on, until BMT root X1 is updated. When ciphertext
C1, counter γ1, and MAC M1 are completed and BMT root
is updated, δ1 is considered completed, after which persist
δ2 can commence. It is clear that even though intermediate
nodes in the BMT update path do not need to persist (only
the leaves and root need to persist), the critical path is due to
their sequential updates.
Fig. 2: The timeline of two data persists and their memory
tuple persists.
2) PLP Mechanism 1: Pipelining BMT Updates: While
the baseline persist mechanism described in Section IV-A1
is correct, it suffers from high overheads. Each node in the
BMT update path must wait until the previous node has been
calculated. In order to improve this situation, recall that the
Persist Order Invariant (Invariant 2) only requires that the
BMT root update follows the persist order. This means that
it is possible to update BMT nodes out of order, as long as
the root is still updated in persist order. This is illustrated in
Figure 3(a), where update paths of persist δ1 and persist δ2
are updated out of order but updates to BMT root are kept in
persist order.
Fig. 3: The timeline of (a) out-of-order BMT updates with
in-order BMT root updates, and (b) pipelined updates with
in-order common ancestor (including BMT root) updates.
While out of order non-root updates are best for perfor-
mance, it is difficult to avoid write-after-write (WAW) hazards
if two persists’ BMT update paths intersect at more than just
the BMT root. To avoid WAW without much complexity, we
design a more restrictive version of the optimization, namely
pipelined BMT update. With a pipelined update, a younger
persist is allowed to update a certain level of BMT only when
an older persist has completed its update of the same level
BMT node. This is illustrated in Figure 3(b). The pipelined
update optimization ensures that if two persists have common
ancestor nodes, they will still be updated in persist order.
Note that as the memory grows bigger, the BMT will
have more levels and hence more pipeline stages. Thus, one
attractive feature of pipelined BMT updates is that with larger
memories, the degree of PLP increases and pipelined BMT
updates becomes even more effective versus non-pipelined
updates.
B. Epoch Persistency
With EP, two persists in the same epochs do not have
persist ordering constraints; persists only need to be ordered
across separate epochs. This fact allows the write-back cache
to reduce the write traffic and also gives us opportunities to
optimize BMT updates. We make a stronger assumption on
EP compared to that in literature: Nalli et. al [36] assert that
75% of epochs update one 64B cache line, where we assume
a minimum of one store per epoch. Specifically, we assume
that crash recovery does not depend on the transient persistent
state within an epoch while an epoch is executing. Instead,
crash recovery depends only on the persistent state at an epoch
boundary. This assumption requires that any actions performed
by an epoch that were not completely persisted prior to crash
must be re-executable. This assumption is reasonable, because
epochs are usually components of a durable transaction, and
durable transactions can be re-executed if they fail.
1) PLP Mechanism 2: Out-of-Order BMT Updates: Invari-
ant 2 applies to two persists that are ordered, i.e. in EP, they
belong to two different epochs. It does not specify how to treat
two persists that are not ordered, such as those belonging to the
same epoch. The question then arises whether two unordered
persists can be performed out of order (OOO), and if so, to
what extent and whether there are any constraints that need to
be observed.
Before discussing them further, let us first discuss the
potential benefit of OOO. OOO BMT updates have a much
better performance potential than (in-order) pipelining for two
reasons. First, it can hide the BMT cache miss latency as
illustrated in Figure 4. Figure 4(a) shows a case where persist
δ1 is attempting to update the BMT, but suffers a cache
miss on BMT node X41. This introduces bubbles in the in-
order BMT update pipeline, and persist δ2 is consequently
delayed, therefore it cannot update X48 until X41 is updated.
Figure 4(b) illustrates that with OOO, both updates can occur
in parallel, with δ2 not being delayed by the cache miss that
δ1 must wait for. Therefore, OOO can achieve a higher degree
of PLP compared to in-order pipelining. Second, OOO BMT
updates enable us to use pipelined MAC units to improve the
throughput. The in-order BMT update pipeline has the same
number of stages as the levels in the BMT and there is at
most one update at each level. Therefore, the throughput of
pipelined BMT is limited to one BMT update per X cycles,
where X is the MAC latency. In contrast, with OOO, a
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BMT update can start at every cycle, thereby increasing the
throughput to one BMT update per cycle.
(b)
TimeX41 X31 X2 X1
X48 X34 X22 X1
Miss
Epoch
Boundary
TimeX41 X31 X21 X1
X48 X34 X22 X1
(a)
Miss
Persist
Boundary
δ1δ2
Fig. 4: The timeline of two data persists with (a) in-order
pipelining and (b) out of order updates.
Regarding correctness of OOO execution of persists from
the same epoch, a concern arises that there may be a write after
write (WAW) hazard in the case where two persists have their
BMT update paths intersecting at not just the BMT root. The
hierarchical nature of BMT dictates that if two BMT update
paths intersect, the intersection representing common ancestors
manifests as common suffix in the paths, starting from the
lowest common ancestor (LCA) node, and then continuing to
the LCA’s parent, grandparent, etc. until the BMT root. Does
updating common ancestor nodes out of order trigger a WAW
hazard? We assert that they do not.
In order to prove it, we note that different blocks will cause
different counters to be updated. Let us denote the old counter
values as γ1o and γ2o and the new values as γ1n and γ2n.
The counters correspond to either one BMT leaf node (if the
counters are co-located in a block) or two BMT leaf nodes (if
the counters are not co-located in a block). In the former, the
leaf node is the LCA, while in the latter the LCA is further up
the tree. Suppose that persist δ1 updates the LCA before δ2.
Then, at the end of the LCA update for both persists, the LCA
value is MACK(γ1n, γ2n, . . .). If instead δ2 updates the LCA
before δ1, the LCA value is also MACK(γ1n, γ2n, . . .), which
is unchanged. Therefore, the final LCA value is the same, and
hence the BMT root is also the same. The intermediate LCA
value is different when δ1 or δ2 update the LCA first. However,
in EP, the crash recovery observer does not expect a particular
persist order for two persists in the same epoch. Furthermore,
Invariant 2 assumes that the crash recovery observer will not
read the transient persistent state between the two persists.
For the latter case, δ1 and δ2 will update different parts of the
LCA, hence the same proof holds.
The epoch boundary, however, places constraints on the
degree of PLP, as it acts as point of ordering; all persists in the
previous epoch must complete prior to any persist in a new
epoch can complete. Thus, the higher the number of persists
in an epoch, the higher is its potential PLP.
To handle OOO, the 2SP only needs minor modifications.
When blocks belonging to persists from the same epoch are
written back from the LLC, they are no longer locked in the
WPQ. They are allowed to drain to persistent memory as they
come. However, the WPQ retains enough state to monitor if the
memory tuples of persists of the same epoch have all arrived at
the WPQ or not. When they have all arrived, they are marked
completed and the epoch is considered complete. On the other
hand, blocks from the next future epoch are locked in the
WPQ and marked incomplete, until the previous epoch has
completed.
2) PLP Mechanism 3: BMT Update Coalescing: Further
analysis of BMT updates within an EP model exposes a
notable scenario that enables our final optimization. BMT
updates within an epoch are likely to involve substantial
number of common ancestor nodes, due to spatial locality.
While OOO allows updates to BMT to be overlapped and
performed out of order, there are still many updates to BMT
nodes that occur. These updates can be considered superfluous
considering that the same node may be updated multiple times
by persists from the same epoch. In our final optimization, we
seek to remove superfluous BMT updates by coalescing them.
Figure 5 illustrates the update order of OOO persists with
coalescing. Without coalescing, each persist incurs updating
of four BMT nodes, causing a total of 12 updates. With coa-
lescing, persists δ1 and δ2 updates are coalesced at their LCA
(node X31), while δ3 is coalesced at the LCA at node X21. As
a result, there are only seven updates to the BMT, which in this
example corresponds to 42% reduction in BMT updates. Fewer
updates to the BMT reduce the occupancy of the memory
integrity verification engine, and hence reduces the latency
and improves the throughput of the engine. Furthermore, an
equally important benefit to coalescing is the number of writes.
Without coalescing, the BMT root is updated three times: with
coalescing, it is updated only once.
Coalescing’s effectiveness increases with spatial locality.
Spatial locality results in nearby blocks being updated. In the
best (and also frequent) case, blocks belonging to the same
encryption page (a 4KB region) are updated within the epoch.
They result in a single counter block being updated multiple
times. Without coalescing, each such update generates BMT
updates from leaf to root, while with coalescing, there is
only one leaf-to-root update, thereby resulting in a substantial
saving.
X21
X44X41 X42 X43
X31 X32 X33 X34
X22
X1 Secure processor boundary
BMT Root
X1
X2
X3
X4
Time
Epoch
Boundary
X41 X31 X21 X1
X42
X44 X32
δ1 δ2 δ3
δ1
δ2
δ3
Fig. 5: Example of coalescing BMT updates starting from the
lowest common ancestors (LCAs) to the BMT root.
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V. ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
In this section, we propose architecture design to enable
the PLP optimizations. As a baseline architecture, we assume
a discrete counter cache [56], BMT cache (mtcache) [4],
[58], MAC cache [62], and persist-gathering WPQ [33]. These
structures suffice if an unoptimized SP model is adhered to. To
support our optimizations, additional structures are introduced,
specifically schedulers, to retain the persist ordering. These
schedulers will contain information that enforces BMT update
order by allowing or preventing writes to occur. Each optimiza-
tion has its own set of conditions for allowing or preventing
writes, and will be analyzed next.
A. Strict Persistency Model: In-order Pipelined BMT Updates
To support our first PLP technique, in-order pipelined BMT
updates for SP, we introduce a new structure called persist
tracking table (PTT) that enforces persist ordering in a SP
model.
The PTT interacts with a scheduler that also interacts with
the BMT cache and the MC / WPQ. Each entry in the PTT has
multiple fields (Figure 6). The field Lvl indicates the level of
the BMT that the persist is currently updating, and is used to
enforce in-order pipelining by staggering persists on different
BMT levels. Figure 6 shows an example of the PTT with four
persist entries. δ1 is updating level 1 (node X1), while δ2 is
updating level 2 (node X21), etc. The valid bit V is set when
the entry is created and cleared when the persist has updated
the BMT root. The ready bit R is set when updating the current
BMT node has been completed, and cleared when the update
moves on to the next node in the BMT update path. The PTT
is managed as a circular buffer using a head and a tail pointer.
The persist flag P is set when the BMT root has been updated
and the entry can be removed: if the head pointer points to
this entry (indicating this entry being the oldest) and the P bit
is set, then BMT update is considered completed, and both the
PTT entry and WPQ entry can be deallocated. The WPQptr
field points to the corresponding persist entry in the WPQ. The
PendingNode field indicates the ID/label of the node currently
being updated.
In the figure, δ1 has finished updating the BMT root hence
V = 0 and P = 1. δ2 and δ4 have updated their current nodes
shown in the PendingNode fields, i.e., X21 for δ2 and X47
for δ4, hence R = 1. δ3’s R bit is not set yet, either because
the BMT node is not yet available for update (e.g. not found
in the BMT cache/being fetched from memory), or the update
has not completed (e.g., MAC is still being calculated).
The role of the scheduler is to decide when a persist can
proceed to updating the next BMT level. To illustrate the
working of the scheduler, suppose a new persist request is
encountered. An entry is created in the WPQ to hold the
data, counter, and MAC to persist. Concurrently, a new PTT
entry is also created (Step 1 ), initialized to point to the
corresponding WPQ entry, with the PendingNode labeled with
the appropriate leaf BMT node (i.e. MAC of counter block).
The valid bit is set, while the ready and persist bits are reset.
In Step 2 , the BMT cache is looked up for the PendingNode.
PTT
0 1 1 1 wpq1 1
V R P Lvl WPQptr PendingNode
1 1 0 2 wpq2 21
1 0 0 3 wpq3 33
1 1 0 4 wpq4 47
Scheduler BMT Cache
WPQwpq1
wpq2
wpq3
wpq4
X41 X42 X43 X44 X45 X46 X47 X48
X31 X32 X33 X34
X21 X22
X1
PendingNodes of various persists
1
3
5
2
Next Node 
Logic 4
δ1
δ2
δ3
δ4
δ1δ2δ3δ4
Fig. 6: Example of in-order pipelined update mechanism with
Persist Tracking Table (PTT) for SP.
If found (BMT cache hit), a new MAC is calculated and the
node updated. If not found (BMT cache miss), the node is
fetched from memory, and the update commences after the
node arrives from memory and is verified for integrity. Once
the BMT node at the current level is updated, the R bit is set.
For the scheduler to allow persist entries to move on to the
next BMT levels, it waits until the R bits of these entries are
set (Step 3 ), indicating completion of udpates to the current
BMT levels. Once the bits are set, the scheduler wakes up the
entries to move on to the next BMT levels. The PendingNode
is input into the Next Node Logic to yield the ID for the next
node to update (Step 4 ).
When the oldest entry (δ1) finishes updating the BMT
root, the entry’s P bit is set and the WPQ is notified of
BMT root update completion (Step 5 ). Afterward, the entry
occupied by δ1 can be released, the head pointer updated,
and execution continues. At the WPQ, if BMT root update
completion notification is received, and other tuple items are
completed (data, counter, and MAC), tuple items are marked
as persisted and become releasable to memory.
B. Epoch Persistency Model: Out-Of-Order Pipelined BMT
Updates
The previous PTT architecture is not capable of managing
BMT updates with EP model with OOO updates of BMT
nodes, as it enforces in-order pipelined updates. What is
unique with EP is that there are two persist ordering policies:
enforced ordering across epochs but not within an epoch.
Thus, we split the PTT design into two tables: an epoch
tracking table (ETT) to track epochs while relegating the
PTT to only track persists. Furthermore, coalescing makes the
PTT more sophisticated, as it must be able to calculate and
track coalescing points of multiple persists. For these reasons,
Figure 7 shows the ETT/PTT split design and also the format
of the PTT entries that enable OOO updates and coalescing.
An ETT is a circular buffer maintaining the order of active
epochs. An ETT entry has the following fields: EID (epoch
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ID), a valid bit V , a ready bit R (which is set when updates
of all persists in the epoch are completed), Lvl indicating the
lowest BMT level being updated by the epoch, index to the
start entry at the PTT (Start) and to the end entry at the
PTT (End). End is incremented (wrapped around on overflow)
when a new persist from an epoch is encountered. Two special
purpose registers are also added: GEC (global epoch counter)
keeps track of the next epoch ID to allocate to a new epoch,
while PEC (pending epoch counter) keeps track of the oldest
active epoch being processed. In the PTT, each entry is added
epoch ID (EID) field to identify the epoch a persist belongs
to.
PTT
1 0 0 1 wpq1 1
V R P Lvl WPQptr PendingNode
1 1 0 2 wpq2 21
0 1 1 1 wpq3 1
1 0 0 3 wpq4 33
X41 X42 X43 X44 X45 X46 X47 X48
X31 X32 X33 X34
X21 X22
X1
PendingNodes of various persists
EID
0
0
0
1
1 1 0 4 wpq5 472
1 0 2 0 2
V R Lvl Start End
1 0 3 3 3
1 1 4 4 4
Epoch1
Epoch2
Epoch3
EID
0
1
2
ETT
Epoch1
Epoch2
Epoch3
δ1,δ3
δ5
δ2
δ4
δ1δ2δ3δ4δ5
Fig. 7: Proposed architecture to enable OOO BMT updates
and update coalescing within an epoch as well as in-order
pipelined BMT updates across different epochs.
Figure 7 illustrates the tables with an example. There are
a total of five persists, with the first three persists from
Epoch1, while the fourth and fifth persists are from Epoch2
and Epoch3, respectively. For example, the entry for Epoch1
at the ETT has Start = 0 and End = 2 to indicate that PTT
indices 0..2 contain information of the persists of Epoch1. δ1,
δ2, and δ3 are within the same epoch, and hence they perform
OOO updates on the BMT root. In the example, δ3 has updated
BMT root X1 (hence in the PTT, P = 1 and V = 0), while
δ1 is working on updating BMT root X1 (hence in the PTT,
P = 0 and V = 1). Since δ3 has persisted, its respective entry
can be released from the WPQ assuming all components of
the security tuple have been received. δ2, on the other hand,
has not reached BMT level 1 but has finished updating BMT
node X21 (hence in the PTT, R = 1. Since Epoch1 is still
working on BMT level 2 node and it is the lowest level that
any persist of Epoch1 is working on, in the ETT, Epoch1’s
Lvl = 2. Epoch2 and Epoch3, consisting of one persist each,
are updating different nodes (X33 and X47, respectively) at
different BMT levels (level 3 and 4, respectively).
The figure illustrates that we exploit two types of paral-
lelisms: epoch-level as well as persist-level parallelism. Within
an epoch, we allow updates to occur OOO. Across epochs,
we pipeline updates to the BMT in the epoch order using
ETT to track and enforce correctness. The ETT mechanism
for pipelining works similarly to the PTT mechanism for
pipelining for SP, but with several modifications. First, the
ready bit of an epoch is set only when all its persists’ ready
bits are also set. The Lvl of an epoch is determined as the
maximum of Lvl field of all the persists of the epoch. With
this, ETT can ensure that each BMT level can only be updated
by persists of a single epoch, which avoids cross-epoch WAW
hazards. When all persists of an epoch’s are completed within
the level(s) that are recorded, an epoch’s R bit is set. When all
epochs’ R bits are set, the epoch-level scheduler is invoked to
advance the epochs to the next levels. If an epoch is at level
1 and its completed, the entry can then be deallocated.
Scheduling at the PTT is also modified. In SP, persists
update the BMT in a pipelined lockstep fashion. With EP,
the persist’s EID is used to check which level the persist is
authorized to update. In the example in the figure, δ5 cannot
advance to level 3 because Epoch3 is only authorized to
update level 4 of the BMT. Apart from epoch-level restriction,
each persist can advance to the next level independently of
other persists. Hence, assuming the level is authorized, persist-
level scheduler allows a persist to advance to the next level
whenever R = 1 for the persist.
C. Epoch Persistency Model: Coalescing BMT Updates
To coalesce updates within an epoch, we first need to find
the common ancestors. We adopt a BMT node labeling scheme
based on the previous work [16]. A unique label is assigned
to each BMT node starting from 0 for the BMT root. To find
the parent of each BMT node, we subtract one from the label
of current node and divided by the arity of the BMT to get the
label of its parent. Then we can round this process down until
the label 0 to get a list of all its ancestors. The least common
ancestor (LCA) between two leaf nodes can be found from
the longest prefix match between the two ancestor lists.
Next, we need to decide where to coalesce and how to
determine which persists are coalesced together. Consider that
it is likely that two persists from the same epoch will share
many BMT nodes that are common. Coalescing can occur
at any such node. However, the closer to leaf the common
ancestor node is, the more effective coalescing become as more
updates are eliminated. Therefore, an important principle for
update coalescing is to coalesce at LCA whenever possible.
The optimal coalescing occurs when the minimum number of
updates is achieved. It requires each persist to be compared
to every other persist in an epoch, and each pair that has the
lowest LCA combined. Then, each combined pair is compared
against every other BMT node or pair, and recombined, etc.
However, this iterative approach is too costly for hardware
implementation. Instead, we opt for paired coalescing, in
which we always coalesced the new persist with previous one
if it has not been coalesced with other persists.
D. Streamlining Counter Tree Updates in Intel SGX
Intel SGX utilizes a ”counter tree” to verify memory in-
tegrity. Similar to BMT, the counter tree does not cover data
because it assumes stateful MAC that protects against spoofing
and splicing. The counter tree protects both the integrity and
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freshness of counters. However, unlike BMT, a counter tree
requires the parent counter value to compute the MAC of
child counters. As a result, to enable crash recovery, the parent
counter value needs to be available and correct in order to
compute the correct MAC value. On a store that persists, the
tree’s entire path from leaf to root nodes must also be persisted,
instead of just the tree root.
Therefore, two changes are needed for crash recovery
correctness. First, Invariant 1 redefines a memory tuple as
consisting of data ciphertext, counter, MAC, and all nodes
of the counter tree from leaf to root along the update path.
Consequently, Invariant 2 expands to include all nodes in the
counter tree update path from leaf to root, in contrast to BMT
which only requires the tree root to provide crash recovery.
This leads to higher costs than BMT. For example, the number
of updates that must persist for one store would scale by
the height of the counter tree. Although the optimizations
described for BMT can be adapted to SGX, we focus only
on BMT due to the extra cost incurred by the counter tree.
VI. EVALUATION
We use the cycle-accurate simulator Gem5 [5] to model the
architecture design described in Section V. The configuration
of the simulated system is presented in Table II.
Processor Configuration
CPU 1 core, OOO, x86 64, 4.00GHz
L1 Cache 8-way, 64KB, 64B block
L2 Cache 512KB, 16-way, 64B block
L3 Cache 4MB, 32-way, 64B block
Metadata Caches
Counter Cache 128KB, 8-way, 64B block
MAC Cache 128KB, 8-way, 64B block
BMT Cache 128KB, 8-way, 9-levels tree, 64B block
MAC Latency 40 processor cycles by default
NVM Parameters
Memory
8 GB DDR based PCM
1200MHz clock
write/read queue: 128/64 entries
tRCD/tXAW/tBUSRT/tWR/tRFC/tCL
=55/50/5/150/5/12.5ns [33]
TABLE II: Simulation Configuration
A. Methodology
Similar to previous work, [30], [58], [62], we utilize
speculative execution for encryption/decryption mechanisms.
Discrete BMT, MAC, and counter caches are implemented for
all schemes discussed, with the configurations in Table II. To
enforce persist ordering, we implemented write through caches
to persist each store to the MC. For pipelined BMT updates,
we maintain a PTT with 64 entries. To support OOO BMT
updates and coalesced BMT updates, we use a 2-entry ETT
(i.e., only allow two concurrent epochs while enforcing the
order between them) and a PTT with 64 entries shared by the
two epochs. An sfence operation is also emulated to prevent
stores from younger epoch being persisted to the memory
before the stores in the elder epoch has been persisted. For
our coalescing update model, we adopt a simple LCA search
mechanism where two adjacent updates to the BMT can be
coalesced each time, with the leading store stopping at the
LCA and delegating the root update to the trailing store.
We use 15 representative benchmarks from SPEC2006 [21]
to evaluate the proposed BMT write update models. All bench-
marks are fast forwarded to representative regions and run
with 100M instructions. The schemes we used for evaluation
include:
• Secure WB model (secure WB): Secure processor
scheme with write-back caches, which do not support any
persistency model.
• Sequential update (sp): Strict persistency model with
sequential updates to the BMT.
• Pipelined (pipeline): Strict persistency model with in-
order pipelined BMT updates.
• Out-of-Order (o3): Epoch persistency model with out-
of-order BMT updates within each epoch but in-order
across epochs. The default epoch size, which is defined
as the number of committed stores in an epoch, is 32.
• Coalescing (coalescing): Epoch persistency model with
coalesced out-of-order BMT updates within each epoch
but in-order across epochs.
In our sensitivity study, we vary the latency of the MAC
computation, metadata cache, and epoch size to analyze their
impacts.
As x86 ISA has a limited number of general purpose
registers, it results in significant spills-and-refills in stack.
Considering that persistent data structures mostly locate in
heap or static/global region, we propose to not protect the
stack region by default. The results where we evaluate full
memory protection are labeled with ’ full’.
B. Evaluation
1) Strict Persistency: In this experiment, we analyze the
following schemes:
• sp full: Atomic SP for entire memory
• pipeline full: pipelined write update for entire memory
• sp: Atomic SP for non-stack memory
• pipeline: Pipelined SP for non-stack memory
Figure 8 shows the execution time of these schemes nor-
malized to the secure WB scheme. We can make two obser-
vations. First, SP incurs very high performance overhead, an
average of 7.2×/30.7× for non-stack/full memory protection.
The key reason is the high cost of persists. In Table III, we
present the number of persists in different schemes. Take the
benchmark, gamess as an example, it has 52 (non-stack) stores
per kilo instructions. As each memory update needs to traverse
the BMT from leaf to root and the MAC computation at each
BMT level takes 40 cycles, it takes a total of 360 cycles to
persist the BMT root in the 9-level BMT. As a result, the BMT
update latency dominates the performance for this benchmark
and we can estimate its performance in IPC (instruction per
cycle) as 1000/(360*52) = 0.053, which is very close to the
actual IPC, 0.054, of the SP scheme for gamess. Considering
the IPC of the secure WB model for gamess being 2.45, the
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slowdown is 45.3× as shown in Figure 8. If we choose to
protect the entire memory (101 stores per kilo instructions), the
slowdown would further increase to 88.9×. Some benchmarks
such as leslie3d and bwaves also have high numbers of persists
but show lower slowdowns than gamess. The reason is that the
secure WB model for these benchmarks have low IPC due to
their high numbers of dirty-block evictions from LLC.
Second, by overlapping the MAC computation latency, our
proposed pipeline model reduces the performance overhead of
SP from 7.2×/30.7× to 2.1×/6.9× for non-stack/full-memory
protection.
Fig. 8: Execution time of SP schemes normalized to se-
cure WB model.
Benchmark CommittedStores secure WB sp epoch
astar 83.48 0.35 13.21 1.97
bwaves 100.27 8.70 61.60 26.47
cactusADM 114.59 1.55 12.35 5.68
gamess 100.72 0 51.38 30.433
gcc 126.73 1.46 67.38 36.64
gobmk 125.16 0.17 34.41 14.63
gromacs 105.73 0.04 9.66 2.69
h264ref 101.17 0 48.80 10.45
leslie3d 108.79 7.78 58.47 17.58
milc 40.18 2 13.65 4.10
namd 133.10 0.18 19.66 2.07
povray 150.72 0 39.23 11.22
sphinx3 184.29 0.10 4.87 1.04
tonto 141.84 0 34.45 16.60
zeusmp 175.87 1.92 19.87 4.66
average 119.51 1.61 32.60 12.41
TABLE III: Number of persists per kilo instructions. The num-
bers in ’committed stores’ and ’secure WB’ include both stack
and non-stack accesses while others exclude stack accesses.
To better understand the impact of MAC latency, in the
next experiment, we vary the MAC latency from 0, 20, 40
and 80 cycles. We also simulate idealistic meta-data caches
(MDC) to study the impact from these caches. The results are
shown in Figure 9. From the figure, we can see that the main
performance bottleneck for SP is indeed the MAC computation
latency. Even a 20-cycle MAC computation latency leads to
a slowdown of 3.2× on average. The MDC has negligible
impact in comparison.
Fig. 9: Execution time of the SP scheme with different MAC
latency and idealistic/realistic MDC
2) Epoch Persistency: Figure 10 reports the performance
of our epoch O3 and coalescing models with an epoch size of
32.
Our results show that using EP scheme to protect non-stack
memory, O3 and coalescing model reduces the performance
slowdown to 20.7% and 20.2%, respectively, compared to the
secure WB model. The performance improvements mainly
come from OOO BMT updates, which enables aggressive
overlapping of MAC latency. Furthermore, a large epoch also
reduces the number of stores that need to be persisted if they
update the same cache line. Such reduction is reported in
Table III. On the other hand, if stack memory needs to be
protected, the frequent updates lead to higher performance
overhead, 2.42× and 2.35× for O3 and coalescing model,
respectively.
Fig. 10: Execution time of epoch persistency schemes normal-
ized to secure WB model.
The results in Figure 10 also show that coalescing has
limited impact on performance. The reason is that in order to
coalesce updates, the older update would wait for the younger
one to reach the LCA. Therefore, the saving from coalescing
is mainly the number of updates to the BMT. Our experiments
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show that our coalescing scheme reduces the BMT updates by
26.1% on average.
Another interesting observation from Figure 10 is that our
optimized epoch persistency model can achieve slightly better
or equal performance compared to secure WB model for some
benchmarks like milc. The reason is that in the secure WB
model, the evicted dirty blocks from LLC perform BMT
updates sequentially rather than the OOO pipelined manner
in our optimized model.
3) Epoch size: Figure 11 shows the performance results of
varying the epoch size for our optimized epoch persistency
model. Besides determining the size of the PTT in our design,
the epoch size has interesting performance implications. On
one hand, large epochs enable higher reductions in the number
of persists, i.e., making a better use of WB caches, as shown
in Figure 12. On the other hand, large epochs lead to bursty
memory updates at the end of each epoch. In contrast, small
epochs smooth the write traffic and benefit from eager write-
back [28] at the cost of higher numbers of persists. In the
extreme case, when the epoch size is 1, our epoch persistency
model is essentially the same as the SP model. This perfor-
mance tradeoff is evident in our results shown in Figure 11.
For small epoch sizes less than 16, multiple benchmarks show
high performance overhead due to the high number of persists.
For the large epoch size of 256, benchmarks such as gamess,
milc, and zeusmp exhibit inferior performance than that for
the epoch size of 128. Based on such performance trends, we
choose the epoch size of 32 due to its good performance at
relatively low hardware cost.
Fig. 11: Execution time of our optimized epoch persistency
model with different epoch sizes normalized to secure WB
model.
4) Metadata Cache Size: In this experiment, we vary the
metadata cache size from 32KB to 256KB. The metadata
caches include a counter cache, a MAC cache, and a BMT
cache. Our results show that our persistency models are not
sensitive to the metadata cache capacity and there is up to 2%
performance difference when we change the cache sizes.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Memory integrity verification and encryption are essential
for implementing secure computing systems. Atomically per-
Fig. 12: The number of persists per kilo instruction for
different epoch sizes.
sisting memory integrity tree roots is responsible for the ma-
jority of the overhead incurred by updating security metadata.
In this work, we presented three optimizations for atomically
persisting NVM Bonsai Merkle Tree roots. With a strict
persistency model, our proposed pipelined update mechanisms
showed an 3.4× performance improvement compared to se-
quential updates. Within an epoch persistency model, our
out-of-order root update and update coalescing mechanisms
showed additional performance improvements of 2.8× over
sequential updates. These optimizations significantly reduce
the time required to update integrity tree roots and pave the
way to make secure NVMM practical.
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